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The Market for News
By SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN AND ANDREI SHLEIFER*
We investigate the market for news under two assumptions: that readers hold beliefs
which they like to see confirmed, and that newspapers can slant stories toward these
beliefs. We show that, on the topics where readers share common beliefs, one should
not expect accuracy even from competitive media: competition results in lower
prices, but common slanting toward reader biases. On topics where reader beliefs
diverge (such as politically divisive issues), however, newspapers segment the
market and slant toward extreme positions. Yet in the aggregate, a reader with
access to all news sources could get an unbiased perspective. Generally speaking,
reader heterogeneity is more important for accuracy in media than competition per
se. (JEL D23, L82)
Several recent books have accused mainline
media outlets of reporting news with a heavy
political bias. Bernard Goldberg (2002) and
Ann Coulter (2003) argue that the bias is on the
left, and provide numerous illustrations of their
argument, while Eric Alterman (2003) and Al
Franken (2003) argue that the bias is on the
right, with equally numerous illustrations. In
principle, media bias can come from the supply
side, and reflect the preferences of journalists
(David Baron, 2004), editors, or owners (Besley
and Andrea Prat, 2004; Simeon Djankov et al.,
2003). Alternatively, it can come from the de-
mand side, and reflect the news providers’
profit-maximizing choice to cater to the prefer-
ences of the consumers. We examine, theoreti-
cally, the determinants of media accuracy in
such a demand-side model, focusing specifi-
cally on the effects of reader beliefs, reader
heterogeneity, and competition on media bias.
We argue that the analysis of media accuracy
relies crucially on how one conceptualizes the
demand for news.
In the traditional conception of the demand
for news, consumers read, watch, and listen to
the news in order to get information. The qual-
ity of this information is its accuracy. The more
accurate the news, the more valuable is its
source to the consumer. Pressure from audi-
ences and rivals forces news outlets to seek and
deliver more accurate information, just as mar-
ket forces motivate auto-makers to produce bet-
ter cars.1
This conception of the news as a source of
pure information is dramatically different from
that of noneconomists studying the media. Ac-
cording to these scholars, private media want to
sell newspapers and television programs, as
well as advertising space. To do that, they pro-
vide a great deal of pure entertainment. But
even with news, audiences want their sources
not only to inform but also to explain, interpret,
persuade, and entertain. To meet this demand,
media outlets do not provide unadulterated in-
formation, but rather tell stories that hang to-
gether and have a point of view, what is referred
to in the business as “the narrative imperative.”2
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1 Ronald Coase (1974), Besley and Robin Burgess
(2002), Besley and Prat (2002), Djankov et al. (2003),
David Stromberg (2001), and Alexander Dyck and Luigi
Zingales (2002) all advance this view of competition in the
media as delivering greater accuracy.
2 H. L. Mencken (1920), Walter Lippmann (1922),
Samuel Hayakawa (1940), Michael Jensen (1979), Doris
Graber (1984), James Hamilton (2003), and the standard
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In this view, news provision can be analyzed in
the same way as entertainment broadcasting.3
In this paper, we examine these two concep-
tions of what the consumers want and what the
media deliver, and evaluate media accuracy un-
der different scenarios. We show, in particular,
that these two conceptions have radically dif-
ferent implications for the accuracy of news in
the competitive media, and more specifically on
the question of which news issues will be re-
ported more accurately.
Our model of rational readers seeking infor-
mation shows that, indeed, consistent with
economists’ priors, media reporting is unbiased.
We compare this to a specific behavioral model
(of which the rational consumers are a special
case), which relies on two assumptions, one
about reader preferences and one about the tech-
nology of delivering news.4 We assume that
readers hold biased beliefs, which might come
from their general knowledge and education,
from previous news, from prejudices and ste-
reotypes, or from the views of politicians or
political parties they trust. With respect to pref-
erences, we assume that readers prefer to hear
or read news that is more consistent with their
beliefs. Such biased readers might believe, for
example, that corporate executives are cheats
and crooks, and these readers prefer news about
their indictments to news about their accom-
plishments. They might think that China is up to
no good with respect to the United States, and
appreciate stories about Chinese spies. Some
readers might like President Bill Clinton and
prefer to read about partisan Republicans per-
secuting the hard-working president; others
might dislike Clinton and look for stories ex-
plaining, in salacious detail, the impeachability
of his offenses.
The idea that people appreciate, find credible,
enjoy, and remember stories consistent with
their beliefs is standard in the communications
literature (Graber, 1984; Severin and Tankard,
1992). Basic research in psychology strongly
supports it. Research on memory suggests that
people tend to remember information consistent
with their beliefs better than information incon-
sistent with their beliefs (Frederic Bartlett,
1932). Research on information processing
shows people find data inconsistent with their
beliefs to be less credible and update less as a
result (Charles Lord et al., 1979; John Zaller,
1992; Matthew Rabin and Joel Schrag, 1999).
According to Graber (1984, p. 130), “stories
about economic failures in third world countries
were processed more readily than stories about
economic successes.” People seek information
that confirms their beliefs (Josh Klayman,
1995). When people categorize, they tend to
ignore category-inconsistent information unless
it is large enough to induce category change
(Susan Fiske, 1995; Mullainathan, 2002). Sev-
erin and Tankard (1992) see the demand for
cognitive consistency as crucially shaping
which news people listen to, and which they
ignore.
Our second assumption is that newspapers
can slant the presentation of the news to cater to
the preferences of their audiences. The term
“slanting” was introduced by Hayakawa (1940),
and defined as “the process of selecting details
that are favorable or unfavorable to the subject
being described.” Slanting is easily illustrated in
a simple example. Suppose that the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) releases data that show
the rate of unemployment rising from 6.1 per-
cent to 6.3 percent. What are the different ways
a paper can report this number? One is a single
sentence report that simply presents the above
fact. But there are alternatives. Consider just
two.
(a) Headline: Recession Fears Grow. New data
suggest the economy is slipping into a re-
cession. The BLS reports that the number of
unemployed grew by 200,000 in the last
quarter, reaching 6.3 percent. John Kenneth
Galbraith, the distinguished Harvard econ-
omist, sees this as an ominous sign of the
failure of the administration’s policies. “Not
since Herbert Hoover has a president ig-
nored economic realities so blatantly. This
news is only the beginning of more to
come,” he said. (Accompanying picture: a
communications textbook (Werner Severin and James
Tankard, Jr., 1992) all advance this view of news.
3 Entertainment broadcasting is analyzed by Peter
Steiner (1952), Michael Spence and Bruce Owen (1977),
Ronald Goettler and Ron Shachar (2001), and Esther Gal-Or
and Anthony Dukes (2003). Jean Gabszewicz et al. (2001)
take the approach closest to ours by conceptualizing news
provision in a Hotelling framework. They examine how
advertisers have an impact on content, whereas we focus on
media accuracy.
4 For concreteness, we talk about newspapers, although
our argument applies equally well to television and radio.
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long line for unemployment benefits in De-
troit, Michigan.)
(b) Headline: Turnaround in Sight. Is the econ-
omy poised for an imminent turnaround?
Data from the BLS suggest that it might be.
Newly released figures show unemploy-
ment inching up just 0.2 percent last quar-
ter. Abbie Joseph Cohen, the chief stock
market strategist at Goldman Sachs, sees
the news as highly encouraging. “This is a
good time to increase exposure to stocks,”
she says, “both because of the strong un-
derlying fundamentals and because the soft-
ness in the labor market bodes well for
corporate profitability.” (Accompanying
picture: smiling Abbie Joseph Cohen.)
Each of these stories could easily have been
written by a major U.S. newspaper. In fact,
stories like these, in light of public disclosure of
identical facts, are written every day. Neither
story says anything false, yet they give radically
different impressions. Each cites an authority,
without acknowledging that a comparably re-
spectable authority might have exactly the op-
posite interpretation of the news. Each omits
some aspect of the data: the first by neglecting
to mention the starting point of the unemploy-
ment rate, the second by ignoring unemploy-
ment levels. Each uses a headline, and a picture,
to persuade readers who do not focus on the
details. Each, in other words, slants the news by
not telling the whole truth, but the articles are
slanted in opposite directions.5
Our model of the market for news combines
the assumption of readers preferring stories con-
sistent with their beliefs with the assumption
that newspapers can slant stories toward specific
beliefs. We examine two crucial aspects of this
environment. First, we consider two alternative
assumptions about the nature of competition:
monopoly versus duopoly. Our model of media
competition is analogous to a Hotelling model
of product placement (Jean Tirole, 1988, ch. 7).
Newspapers locate themselves in the product
space through their reporting strategies (i.e.,
how they slant). Readers’ beliefs determine
their “transportation” costs, since they face psy-
chic costs of reading papers whose reporting
does not cater to their beliefs. We ask whether
competition by itself eliminates or reduces the
slanting of news, as economists often argue. We
show that the answer for biased readers is
clearly no. Competition generally reduces
newspaper prices, but does not reduce, and
might even exaggerate, media bias.
Second, we study heterogeneity of reader be-
liefs. What effect does such heterogeneity have
on the nature of slanting and the overall accu-
racy in media? What is the impact of competi-
tion on media accuracy when reader beliefs are
heterogeneous, as in the case of beliefs about
President Clinton? To answer this question, it is
crucial to distinguish between an average
reader, who reads one source of news, and a
hypothetical conscientious reader, who reads
multiple sources. In general, competition with
heterogeneous readers increases the slanting by
individual media sources. But with heteroge-
neous readers, the biases of individual media
sources tend to offset each other, so the beliefs
of the conscientious reader become more accu-
rate than they are with homogeneous readers.
Our central finding is that reader heterogeneity
plays a more important role for accuracy in
media than does competition.
At a broader level, this paper contributes
to one of the central issues in economics,
namely whether the presence of rational,
profit-maximizing firms eliminates any effect of
irrational participants on market “efficiency.” In
the context of financial markets, Milton Fried-
man (1953) argued long ago that it does, and
that rational arbitrageurs keep financial markets
efficient. Subsequent research, however, has
proved him wrong, both theoretically and em-
pirically (Shleifer, 2000; Markus Brunnermeier
and Stefan Nagel, 2004). One finding of this
research is that, in some situations, such as stock
market bubbles, it might pay profit-maximizing
firms to pump up the tulips rather than eliminate
irrationality (Brad DeLong et al., 1990). Subse-
quent research has considered the interaction
between biased individuals and rational en-
trepreneurs in other contexts, such as the
incitement of hatred (Glaeser, 2005), political
competition (Kevin Murphy and Shleifer,
2004), and product design (Xavier Gabaix and
Laibson, 2004). Here we ask a closely related
question for the market for news: does compe-
tition among profit-maximizing news providers
5 Persuasion can also work through outright fabrication
of news, as was done routinely by the Communist press, and
occasionally even in Western newspapers (e.g., Jason
Blair’s reporting for the New York Times.)
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eliminate media bias? We find that the answer,
in both financial and political markets, is no.
Powerful forces motivate news providers to slant
and increase bias rather than clear up confusion.
The crucial determinant of accuracy is not com-
petition, per se, but consumer heterogeneity.
I. Model Setup
Readers are interested in some underlying
variable t, such as the state of the economy,
which is distributed N(0, vt). Let p  1/vt denote
the precision. Readers hold a belief about t that
may be biased; beliefs are distributed N(b, vt).
Thus, readers are potentially biased about the
expected value of t, but have the correct
variance.
Newspapers are in the business of reporting
news about t. They receive some data d  t 
, where   N(0, v). In the example from the
introduction, these data might be an unemploy-
ment rate release. We assume that the papers
then report the data with a slant s, so the re-
ported news is n  d  s. For most of the paper,
the exact technology of slanting is not impor-
tant, but in Section V we study a specific one.
A. Reader Utility
Suppose readers are rational and unbiased.
All they want is information. They dislike slant-
ing because it is costly both in effort and the
time it takes to read slanted news and figure out
the “truth.” In the BLS example, the report of
the first newspaper does not tell the reader how
much the unemployment rate changed, while
that of the second newspaper does not contain
the unemployment rate. To get a full picture, the
reader needs more information. We assume that
a rational reader’s utility is decreasing in the
amount of slanting. So, if he reads a newspaper,
his utility is:
(1) Ur  u  s2  P
where P is the paper’s price. If he does not read
the newspaper, he receives utility 0.
Biased readers, on the other hand, get disutil-
ity from reading news inconsistent with their
beliefs. We model consistency as the distance
between the news and the reader’s beliefs, b,
measured as (n  b)2. In the BLS example, a
reader optimistic about the economy experi-
ences disutility when reading stories that sug-
gest a recession. At the same time, even biased
readers dislike blatant and extreme slanting, at
least in the long run. Holding constant the con-
sistency with beliefs, they prefer less slanted
news.6 So, if he reads the newspaper, the overall
utility of a biased reader is:
(2) Ub  u  s2  n  b2  P
where   0 calibrates his preference for hear-
ing confirming news.
B. Newspaper Strategy
Before seeing the data d, a newspaper an-
nounces its slanting strategy s(d) and the price P
it charges. Potential readers buy the paper if the
price P is lower than the expected utility asso-
ciated with reading the paper, Ed[U(s(d))]. To
form expected utility, expectations are taken
over d and are assumed to be the true expecta-
tions (d  N(t, vd)) rather than the biased ones.
This approach crudely captures the idea that this
is a long-run game. Readers get a general sense
of how much pleasure the paper provides them
and make their purchasing decisions accord-
ingly. It then makes more sense to think of
expected utility using the empirical distribu-
tions. Practically, in the model both assump-
tions about expectations produce the same
results.
Once readers decide whether to buy the pa-
per, the paper observes its signal d and reports
n  d  s(d). Readers read the news and
receive their utility. Timing of the full game is
as follows:
(a) The newspaper announces a strategy s(d)
for how to report the news. When there are
two papers, both announce strategies
simultaneously.
(b) Price P is announced. When there are two
papers, both announce prices simultaneously,
after the other paper has revealed its strategy.
6 This assumption is immaterial to our results. All we
require is that newspapers face some quadratic cost of
slanting. This cost could just as easily arise on the supply
side, with firms facing a technological or private reputa-
tional cost of slanting, and the results would be the same.
The necessary feature is that firms cannot slant freely.
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(c) Individuals decide whether to buy the paper
based on average utility associated with its
strategy s(d) and price P.
(d) Newspaper receives data d and reports news
d  s(d). If there are two papers, they
receive the same data d and report d  sj(d)
where j  1, 2.
(e) If individuals buy the paper, they read the
news and receive utility.
C. Cases Considered
We consider two different distributions of
reader beliefs: homogeneous and heteroge-
neous. Homogeneity means that all readers hold
the same beliefs b with precision p. For exam-
ple, all or nearly all readers in the United States
might believe that the Russians are corrupt or
that the French are anti-American. Heterogene-
ity means that there is a distribution of reader
beliefs. Such heterogeneity could come from
political ideology. For example, opinions about
U.S. presidents often divide along party lines.
We assume that heterogeneous beliefs are dis-
tributed uniformly between b1 and b2 where
b1  b2 and b2  0. Readers in this uniform
distribution are indexed by i  [1, 2] so that
reader i holds belief bi. All readers hold their
beliefs with precision p. We denote by b the
average of b1 and b2. We also denote reader i’s
utility function as ui(d) or ubi(d), depending on
context. The homogeneous and heterogeneous
cases are designed to capture two different types
of issues: ones on which there is consensus in
the population and ones where there is substan-
tial disagreement.
We also examine two cases of industry struc-
ture. In the first case, there is a single monop-
olistic newspaper. In the second, there are two
newspapers, indexed by j  1, 2, each seeing
the same data d. For a monopolist, s*hom and s*het
denote the optimal slanting strategy for the ho-
mogeneous and heterogeneous case. Similarly,
P*hom and P*het denote optimal price in these
cases. For duopolists, s*j,hom and s*j,het denote the
optimal strategy of paper j  1, 2 in the homo-
geneous and heterogeneous cases, respectively.
Similarly, P*j,hom and P*j,het denote each duop-
olist’s optimal price in these two cases.
This formalism of industry structure is simi-
lar in spirit to a Hotelling model. Readers’ be-
liefs resemble consumers’ preferred locations.
Their dislike of inconsistent news resembles
transportation costs. Firms’ choice of a slanting
rule resembles their choice of location. In this
context, our utility function implies quadratic
transportation costs and our distribution of
reader beliefs in the heterogeneous case corre-
sponds to a uniform distribution of consumers.
Consequently, many of our proofs resemble the
proofs for the Hotelling models in this case
(Claude d’Aspremont et al., 1979).7
D. Defining Bias
We are interested in the extent of newspaper
bias in the market. We measure this by the
average bias of the newspapers in the market,
weighted by their market share. In the homoge-
neous case, where there is only one kind of
reader, we simply define bias as
(3) ARBhom  Ed	n d2

where n is the news read by these readers. So
bias is defined as the average amount by which
the news read deviates from the data for the
average reader.
In the heterogeneous case, let ni be the news
read by reader i [1, 2]. Bias is then defined as:
(4) ARBhet  
i
Ed	ni  d2
.
This measures the average bias that readers
encounter.
II. Rational Readers
When readers are rational, newspapers face
only a disincentive to slant. The following prop-
osition summarizes the outcomes for different
cases.
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose readers are ratio-
nal. Then, whether readers are homogeneous or
7 As with all Hotelling models, the assumptions on trans-
portation costs matter. With linear transportation costs, an
equilibrium does not exist. But while the results depend on
nonlinear transportation costs, they are not specific to the
quadratic. Other convex functions produce similar results
(Nicholas Economides, 1986). See Steffen Brenner (2001)
for a survey. Similarly, as with all Hotelling models, the
assumption of Bertrand competition is key to our results.
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heterogeneous, the monopolist does not slant
and charges the same price:
(5) s*hom  s*het  0
and
(6) P*hom  P*het  u .
In the duopolist case as well, papers do not
slant and once again charge the same price:
(7) s*j,hom  s*j.het  0
and
(8) P*j,hom  P*j.het  0
for all j on the equilibrium path. The only effect
of competition is to lower prices.
PROOF:
See Appendix for all proofs.
Proposition 1 illustrates the normal logic of
economists’ thinking about the media. When
readers seek accuracy in news, newspapers pass
on, without slant, the information they receive.
Since perfect quality is achieved even without
competition, the effect of competition is to re-
duce the price that readers pay. With both mo-
nopoly and duopoly, consumers get what they
want and there is no media bias.8 In the rest of
the paper, we focus on the case of biased
readers.
III. Homogeneous Biased Readers
The following proposition summarizes the mo-
nopolist’s behavior with homogeneous readers.
PROPOSITION 2: A monopolist facing a ho-
mogeneous audience chooses:
(9) s*hom d

 
b d
(10) P*hom  u 

  
	b2  vd

if u  [/( )][b2  vd]. If not, there exists
no slanting strategy that results in the news
being read.
Because the monopolist can capture all sur-
plus through the price he charges, to maximize
profits he merely maximizes expected utility.
The news he reports is:
(11) n  
  
b 

  
d.
The reported news is a convex combination of
bias and data, with weights given by utility
parameters. In this case, we say the monopolist
“slants toward b.” Since this linear slanting
strategy will reappear throughout the paper, we
define:
(12) sB d 

  
B  d.
With this notation, the proposition above can be
rewritten as s*hom(d)  sb(d). The monopolist
chooses this linear form because expected util-
ity functions are separable in the value of d. The
monopolist maximizes utility for every given
value of d, which leads him to slant toward a
biased reader’s beliefs.9
The following corollary derives comparative
statics for the magnitude of slanting.
COROLLARY 1: In the homogeneous reader
case, slanting increases with the reader prefer-
ence for hearing confirmatory news and de-
clines with the cost of slanting:
(13) s
*hom d

 0
(14) s
*hom d

	 0.
8 As is clear from the proof of the proposition, this result
generalizes trivially to J  2 newspapers.
9 Even when b  0, there is slanting. This is because
even a reader who has zero bias ex ante does not want to
change his mind ex post. Consequently, the monopolist
slants news toward the reader’s bias, 0.
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Proposition 2 suggests a theory of spin. Sup-
pose that a politician, or some other figure of
authority, has a first mover advantage, i.e., can
choose which data d gets presented to the media
first. The papers slant the data toward reader
beliefs, but by Proposition 2, d will have sig-
nificant influence on what papers report as com-
pared to their getting data from an unbiased
source. For example, by preemptively disclos-
ing that a Chinese spy has been found in Los
Alamos, a politician can focus the discussion on
the risk to U.S. security from Chinese espio-
nage, rather than on the administrative incom-
petence in the Department of Energy. This
effect becomes even more powerful in a more
general model of sequential reporting. In this
case, the initial spin may shape reader priors,
which future papers face and consequently slant
news toward. The initial spin would then be
reinforced even by ideologically neutral papers.
The condition u  [/(  )][b2  vd]
guarantees that this reader’s reservation utility u
is high enough that he prefers reading the opti-
mally biased news to no news. From now on,
we assume that this condition holds.
ASSUMPTION 1: Reader utility from news is
high enough that readers prefer the equilibrium
news to no news:
(15) u  
  
	b2  vd 
.
With this assumption in place, we now turn to
competition. How does competition between
two newspapers affect the results above?
PROPOSITION 3: Suppose duopolists face a
homogeneous audience. Then there is an equi-
librium in which duopolists choose on the equi-
librium path:
(16) s*j,hom d

 
b d
and prices
(17) P*j,hom  0
for both j  1, 2. Readers are indifferent be-
tween the two papers.
With a homogeneous audience, competition is
Bertrand-like: it simply drives prices down to
zero.10 Each duopolist’s slant is exactly equal to
the monopolist’s slant, and they split the readers
between them. The following corollary summa-
rizes the impact of competition on bias in the
homogeneous case.11
COROLLARY 2: For a homogeneous audi-
ence, both monopoly and duopoly produce the
same amount of average reader bias:
(18) ARBmonvd ARBduovd.
Propositions 2 and 3 are the first critical re-
sults of the paper. They show that when readers
have homogeneous biases, competition does not
eliminate them—it only leads to price reduc-
tions. Both monopolists and duopolists cater to
reader prejudices. These propositions basically
say that one cannot expect accuracy—even in
the competitive media—on issues where the
readers share beliefs. One example of such uni-
formity might be foreign affairs, where there
may be a great deal of commonality of views
toward a particular foreign country, such as
Russia, China, or France. Another example is
law enforcement, where most readers might
sympathize with efforts by the government to
prosecute members of a disliked group (e.g., the
Arabs or the rich).
IV. Heterogeneous Biased Readers
What happens when readers differ in their
beliefs? Newspapers must now decide which
one of the heterogeneous reader groups is its
target audience.
PROPOSITION 4: Suppose a monopolist faces
a heterogeneous audience with b  0. There
exists a Cm, which depends on the parameters of
the model, that determines the monopolist’s
strategy. If b2  b1  Cm, the monopolist max-
imizes profits by choosing:
10 For this same reason, and as is clear from the proof of
the proposition, this result holds for any number of news-
papers J 
 2.
11 The stated equilibrium for the duopolists is not unique
because any strategy profile that differs on a set of measure
zero would also be an equilibrium.
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(19) s*het  s bd

 
b  d

  
d
(20) P*het  u 

  
vd 2b22.
If b2  b1  Cm the monopolist chooses not to
cover the market, i.e., not all readers read the
paper.
According to Proposition 4, the monopolist cov-
ers the market if the dispersion of reader beliefs
is small enough. If beliefs are too far apart,
readers on either extreme will not read the
paper.12
Duopolists, in contrast, respond completely
differently to heterogeneity. For tractability, we
now consider only the situation where duop-
olists choose linear strategies.
PROPOSITION 5: Suppose duopolists choose
linear strategies of the form sB(d)  [/( 
)](B  d) and that b  0. Then there exists a
constant
(21) Cd   433   2 u   vd
such that if b2  Cd duopolists choose:
(22) s*1,het d 

   32 b1  d1
(23) s*2,het d 

   32 b2  d2
(24) P*j,het 
62
  
b22
where we assume, without loss of generality,
that firm 1 slants toward the left and firm 2
slants toward the right. All readers read the
newspaper.
Each duopolist positions himself as far away
from the other as possible. The reported news in
this case equals
(25) nj d s*j,hetd

 
3
2 bj 

  
dj .
The reported news is a weighted average of the
actual data d and 3⁄2 bj, where bj is the endpoint
of the reader bias distribution. So duopolists are
slanting news toward 3⁄2 bj, points that are more
extreme than the most extreme readers in the
population.
This is analogous to the standard Hotelling
result with uniform distributions and quadratic
transportation costs (Tirole, 1988; d’Aspremont
et al., 1979). As in the standard Hotelling
model, the monopolist caters to both audiences
unless they are too far apart, while duopolists
maximally differentiate. But in the standard Ho-
telling model, firms are constrained to choose
within the preference distribution. In our model,
they can choose positions outside the distribu-
tion of reader bias, and in equilibrium choose
very extreme positions.13
To see why this occurs, consider a simple
case where   1,   1, b2  1 and b1  1.
With these parameters, suppose the firms locate
at z1  z2.
14 Equilibrium prices then equal (see
the proof of Proposition 5):
(26) P*1 z1 , z2   z1  z3
(27) P*2 z1 , z2   z1  z3
where z  z2  z1 and z  (z1  z2)/2. The
more differentiated the duopolists (the greater is
12 If b  0, but b2  b1  Cm, the monopolist would use
the same slanting strategy as in Proposition 4, but would
charge a high enough price that not all people read the
paper. The case where b  0 is more complicated. The
monopolist would not slant toward b anymore. Instead, he
would slant toward a point between b and 0. This is because
readers closer to the origin enjoy higher overall surplus
from reading the paper (see Lemma (A1)). Consequently,
the monopolist would prefer a distribution of readers closer
to the origin so as to be able to charge higher prices.
13 If b  0 but b2  Cd, the duopolists differentiate less
than stated in Proposition 5. The participation constraint of
the reader with bias 0 begins to bind and the duopolists
locate closer together than in the proposition. If b2 is suffi-
ciently large, the duopolists would even end up inside the
distribution of reader beliefs so that zj  bj.
14 Recall that “located at z” means the paper biases
according to the rule sz(d)  [/(  )](z  d).
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z), the higher the prices they can charge. Dif-
ferentiation softens price competition because
the temptation to undercut each other diminishes
as the firms move farther away from the mar-
ginal consumer (who is located between them).
Now consider firm 1’s choice of where to
locate. When biasing toward z1, firm 1 captures
all readers between 1 and x*(z1, z2)  z/3.
Hence its profits equal P*1(1  z/3). Differenti-
ating with respect to z1 gives the first-order
condition
(28) P
*1
z1
x*z1 , z2   P*1x*z1   0
(29) P
*1
z1
1  z3  P*113  0.
Increasing z1 (that is, moving closer to the ori-
gin) has two effects on profits. The first is a
price effect; there is a change in profits because
changing position affects the equilibrium prices.
The second is a market share effect; there is a
change in profits because moving closer to the
origin raises market share.
Papers slant toward positions well beyond the
extreme consumers because the price effect
dominates the market share effect until firms are
very far apart. Focusing on the symmetric case
with z  0, the price effect is P*1/z1  z/6 
1. The price effect is negative as long as z 
6, in other words, until the difference in firm
locations is three times as high as the difference
in most extreme readers (3(b2  b1)  6). The
market share effect, on the other hand, is P*1/3 
z/6. These two effects offset each other to
produce an optimum when z/6  1  z/6 
0 or z  3. At the symmetric equilibrium, the
optimum is reached at z  2z1  3 or z1 
 3⁄2 . The distance between the newspapers
(z2  z1  3) is greater than the distance
between the most extreme readers (b2  b1  2).
In short, when choosing how to slant,
duopolists maximally differentiate them-
selves.15 Practically, this means that news
sources can be even more extreme than their
most biased readers. One cannot, therefore, in-
fer reader beliefs directly from media bias.
Another point is worth noting:
(30) E	s*j,het d

 E	s*hetd
.
Duopolists always slant more than the monop-
olist when readers are heterogeneous. In this
sense, competition tends to polarize the news.
The following corollary summarizes the impact
of competition on bias.
COROLLARY 3: Suppose b1  b2  Cm. In
the heterogeneous reader case, competition in-
creases the bias of the average reader:
(31) ARBmon,hetvd	 ARBduo,hetvd.
Corollary 3 shows that, with heterogeneous
readers, competition by itself polarizes reader-
ship and, if anything, raises the average reader
bias. Entry of a left-wing newspaper or a TV
station into a local market previously dominated
by a moderate or slightly right-wing monopolist
might cause this monopolist to shift his report-
ing to the right.
Corollary 3 might shed light on the growing
controversy in the United States about media
bias. Several recent books have angrily attacked
media outlets for having a left-wing bias (e.g.,
Goldberg, 2002; Coulter, 2003). Several equally
angry books have responded that other media
outlets have an even stronger right-wing bias
(Alterman, 2003; Franken, 2003). We suspect
that there is a grain of truth in all these books,
and that the growing partisanship of alternative
media sources is a response to the growth in
competition, and market segmentation, in the
media. Changes in media technology have led
to significant entry, especially in television. If
these media sources divide the market along
ideological lines, we expect them to become
more biased than they were in the regime of
moderate competition. This is perhaps what the
various commentators are recognizing.
Corollary 3 may also have implications for
the effects of entry of new media outlets on the
nature of reporting. In a provocative recent
study, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004) examine
the responses to a Gallup poll by residents of
nine Muslim countries about such topics as the
15 This analysis also illustrates why Proposition 5 is
about competition, per se, and not about variety alone. A
monopolist who could start two newspapers does not need
to differentiate to increase market power. He would differ-
entiate simply to cater to reader tastes, but would not go
beyond the most extreme readers as duopolists would.
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United States, terrorism, responsibility for 9/11,
and so on. The authors document a striking
pattern of factually inaccurate beliefs, but also
suggest that the media have a strong effect on
these beliefs. In particular, those who watch
al-Jazeera (Arab television) are much more
likely to hold factually false beliefs (as well as
anti-American ones) than those watching
CNN.16 In concluding their paper, Gentzkow
and Shapiro appear to endorse recent proposals
favoring an expansion of Western news in the
Arab world, because such news is likely to
moderate opinions and beliefs.
Our model suggests that caution is appropri-
ate. The people who watch or listen to Western
news are already sympathetic to its perspective
and might already watch CNN, so they are
unlikely to be strongly affected. Additional en-
try might cause al-Jazeera and similar networks
to further differentiate their product by advanc-
ing yet more extreme views. The effect might
be to radicalize, rather than moderate, their
audience.
V. Reader Heterogeneity and Accuracy in
Media
Our results so far focus on how an average
reader in the population is affected. We can also
look at the impact of reporting on a conscien-
tious reader, a hypothetical reader who reads all
the news available but is too small to affect
what is reported. The interesting insights arise
in the duopoly case where the hypothetical con-
scientious reader reads both papers. Since both
papers are reporting on the same event, the
conscientious reader might in principle be able
to use the two to undo the slanting. To under-
stand this process we need a precise model of
slanting.
A. Technology of Slanting
Following Hayakawa (1940), we assume that
newspapers slant by selectively omitting spe-
cific bits of news, i.e., not reporting the whole
truth.17 To formalize this idea, suppose that,
rather than simply receiving a composite d 
t  , the newspaper receives a sequence of
positive and negative “bits” or facts. In the
example from the introduction, these facts could
be the unemployment rate, the unemployment
rate in the past, expert opinions, other relevant
economic indicators, and so on. These bits or
facts are modeled as a length L string f consist-
ing of positive (1), negative (1), or nonex-
istent (A) pieces of news. At each position, the
probability of each of these values is a function
of d, so now instead of simply seeing the com-
posite d, the paper sees all the bits of facts that
constitute it. The probability that the piece of
news in position i, denoted fi, is positive, neg-
ative, or nonexistent is given by the distribution
function:
(32) Pr fi 	1 qgd1 q1 gd
A 1 q
where g is a continuous and increasing func-
tion that is bounded between 0 and 1, and 0 
q  1. With probability 1  q, there is no news
at position i. If there is news, it is positive with
probability g(d) and negative otherwise. Condi-
tional on d, these probabilities are iid across
different bits on a string. With multiple papers,
we assume that they all see the same string f.
A newspaper that does not slant at all would
simply report the string f without alteration. A
reader who sees the string f can draw inferences
from the number of 1’s and 1’s, which we
define as N( f ) and N( f ), respectively. By the
Law of Large Numbers:
(33) NfNf  Nf  gd   3 gd
where  is a noise term that converges to zero as
the length of the string L 3 . Consequently,
for large L, the information the reader receives
16 These results are not unique to the Muslim world.
Steven Kull et al. (2003) document significant confusion
among large percentages of U.S. respondents on such ques-
tions as Saddam Hussein’s culpability in 9/11 and the dis-
covery of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The study
also finds that those who get their news from Fox News are
less well informed about these issues than those who get
their news from PBS and NPR.
17 Importantly, newspapers do not slant by simply man-
ufacturing evidence.
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is well approximated by the case in which he
simply observes d since g1[N( f )/(N( f ) 
N( f ))] 3 d.
In this formalism, a newspaper slants the
signal by selectively omitting positive or nega-
tive bits of information. To slant upward, for
example, a newspaper drops negative bits. In-
stead of reporting 1, 1, 1, A, 1, 1, ... it
reports 1, A, A, A, 1, 1 ... , for example.
A paper that wishes to slant upward by s  0
produces a string f by dropping enough nega-
tive bits to guarantee
(34) g1 NfNf  Nf 
 d  s.
Likewise, a paper that wishes to slant negatively
by s  0 simply drops enough positive bits. As
L 3 , the paper can choose to drop bits to
approximate better and better any given slant s.
For simplicity, assume that newspapers omit
facts in fixed ways. To slant positively, a paper
omits the lowest indexed negative bits until it
approximates the desired fraction. To slant neg-
atively, a paper omits the lowest indexed posi-
tive bits until it reaches the desired fraction.
This assumption is simply one way of formal-
izing the idea that two papers wishing to slant in
a particular direction do so similarly.
B. Cross-Checking
By cross-checking the facts in the two news-
papers, a conscientious reader may be able to
reduce the effect of slanting. Suppose each pa-
per receives string f, which can be thought of as
implying data d  t  , and paper j reports
string fj. There are now several cases. If the
implied slants for both papers are positive and
s1  s2  0, then every fact that paper 1 reports,
paper 2 also reports. Moreover, because paper 2
is slanting less, it reports some facts that paper
1 does not. Consequently, a conscientious
reader would interpret the news as if she had
read only paper 2. The case where 0  s2  s1
is similar. On the other hand, if the two papers
are on opposite sides of the issue so that s1 
0  s2, paper 1 omits some negative details to
slant upward and paper 2 omits some positive
details to slant downward. The conscientious
reader, however, can cross-check both papers.
Paper 1 reports the positive facts, which paper 2
omits, and paper 2 reports the negative facts,
which paper 1 omits. By cross-checking, the
conscientious reader gets all the facts, as if she
were able to read an unslanted newspaper. De-
fine xc to be the cross-checking function:
(35) xcs1 , s2 	mins1 , s2 if s1  0, s2  0maxs1 , s2 if s1 	 0, s2 	 0
0 otherwise.
This function summarizes how the conscien-
tious reader can cross-check the two papers.18
Define nc to be the news the conscientious
reader is effectively exposed to:
(36) nc  	n if one newspaperd xcs1 , s2 if two newspapers.
We then define conscientious reader bias anal-
ogously to the average reader bias:
(37) CRB Ed	nc  d2
.
This definition of conscientious reader bias is
independent of heterogeneity of reader beliefs.
However, CRB does depend on the equilibrium
news reporting, which in turn may depend on
the heterogeneity of reader beliefs.
As the discussion on cross-checking sug-
gests, reader heterogeneity can help the consci-
entious reader quite a bit. To formalize this, let
us compare the case of homogeneous readers
with bias b to the case of heterogeneous readers
with beliefs distributed uniformly on [b  ,
b  ]. The following corollary summarizes our
principal finding:
COROLLARY 4: The interaction of reader
heterogeneity and duopoly lowers conscientious
reader bias. When readers are heterogeneous,
conscientious reader bias is lower under
duopoly than monopoly:
(38) CRBhet,duo 	 CRBhet,mon.
18 The extreme cross-checking depends on the two pa-
pers slanting stories using the same rule. It is necessary for
our results only that the papers use similar rules. Suppose
that when one paper omits a fact, it appears in a oppositely
slanted paper only with probability z. In this case, the
cross-checking function becomes (1  z)s1  (1  z)s2 
zxc(s1, s2). Thus, the qualitative statements we make are
preserved.
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Under duopoly, conscientious reader bias is
lower under heterogeneity than homogeneity:
(39) CRBhet,duo 	 CRBhom,duo.
Corollary 4 is the final result of our paper and its
bottom line. It points to the absolutely central
role that heterogeneity of reader beliefs plays in
assuring accuracy in media. We have shown
that when readers are homogeneous, competi-
tion results in lower prices, but not in accurate
news reporting. When readers are heteroge-
neous, the news received by the average reader
might become even more biased as competitive
media outlets segment the market. Such market
segmentation, however, benefits a conscientious
reader, who can then aggregate the news from
different sources to synthesize a more accurate
picture of reality. When newspapers are at dif-
ferent sides of the political spectrum, the con-
scientious reader gets all the facts. While
individual news sources slant even more when
faced with a heterogeneous public, the aggre-
gate picture becomes more clear. In this respect,
reader heterogeneity is the crucial antidote to
media bias.
This analysis indicates which issues are more
likely to receive accurate media coverage, at
least for the conscientious reader. Almost
surely, the most likely domain of reader heter-
ogeneity is domestic politics, where readers
have diverse beliefs and media coverage is cor-
respondingly diverse. Such dispersion of reader
beliefs could come from their self-interested
economic and social preferences, what used to
be called “class differences.” But, as Glaeser
(2005) argues, such differences are reinforced
by political entrepreneurs, who have an incen-
tive to create particular beliefs that would bring
them support, especially if these beliefs distin-
guish them from the incumbent. Newspapers
would then follow these entrepreneurs in mir-
roring and reinforcing the beliefs of their sup-
porters. In fact, in many countries today, and in
the United States 100 years ago, newspapers
were affiliated with political parties (Hamilton,
2003). Reader diversity, and newspaper diver-
sity, are partly a reflection of underlying polit-
ical competition. In other areas of competition,
such as sports, we likewise expect local papers
to support local teams, thereby creating diver-
sity of reporting across cities reflecting the di-
versity of reader beliefs.
Perhaps the clearest illustration of this corol-
lary is the coverage of the Monica Lewinsky
affair during the Clinton presidency. The left-
wing press presented an enormous amount of
information designed to expiate the president’s
sins, while the right-wing press dug out as many
details pointing to his culpability. In the end,
however, as Posner (1999) remarks in his book,
much of the truth has come out and a conscien-
tious reader could get a fairly complete picture
of reality.
VI. Conclusion
We have examined the roles of two forces in
promoting accuracy in media: competition and
reader diversity. We have found that competi-
tion by itself is not a powerful force toward
accuracy. Competition forces newspapers to ca-
ter to the prejudices of their readers, and greater
competition typically results in more aggressive
catering to such prejudices as competitors strive
to divide the market. On the other hand, we
found that reader diversity is a powerful force
toward accuracy, as long as accuracy is inter-
preted as some aggregate measure of revelation
of information to a reader who takes in all the
news. Greater partisanship and bias of individ-
ual media outlets may result in a more accurate
picture being presented to a conscientious reader.
Reader heterogeneity comes in part from
underlying political competition, whereby po-
litical parties, movements, and individual en-
trepreneurs attempt to generate support by
presenting their points of view. If they can
generate enough interest, media outlets will try
to cater to the very same audiences that the
political entrepreneurs attract, and diversity in
media coverage will arise endogenously. In
contrast, when potential audiences share similar
beliefs, and when there is no advantage from
political entry, such as the coverage of foreign
countries or crime, we do not expect to see
diversity of media reports or accuracy in media.
Political competition is only one source of
underlying reader diversity. We can also imag-
ine entrepreneurs starting newspapers on their
own and, as long as they have deep enough
pockets, creating enough demand for unortho-
dox views to broaden the range of opinions (and
slants) that are being covered. Ideological di-
versity of entrepreneurs themselves may be the
source of diversity of media coverage.
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We have studied competitive persuasion in the
market for news. Our principal finding is that,
when competitors can create or reinforce differ-
ences of opinion, they will do so in order to divide
the market and reap higher profits. There will be
no convergence in reporting to the median reader
(as in a Downsian median voter framework). We
believe that this consequence of competitive per-
suasion is more general, and that attempts to dif-
ferentiate competitively by moving toward
extreme positions will arise in both political (Mur-
phy and Shleifer, 2004) and product (Gabaix and
Laibson, 2004) markets. In these and other do-
mains, the influence of audience heterogeneity
and competition on the content of persuasive mes-
sages remains to be fully explored.
APPENDIX A: LEMMAS
LEMMA A1: Define
(A1) sB d 

  
B  d
to be the strategy where a newspaper biases around point B. The reader’s expected utility (gross
of price) of reading such a newspaper is:
(A2) Ed 	UsB d
  u 

  
	vd  b2
 
2
  
	B  b
2.
Consequently when B  0:
(A3) Ed 	Us0 d
  u 

  
vd  b2.
And when B  b:
(A4) Ed 	Usb d
  u 

  
vd  b2.
PROOF:
Expected utility for sB(d) is:
(A5) u   
d
    B  d
2
  
d
d     B  d  b
2
.
The first integral is:
(A6)    
2
	B2  vd

because E[d]  0 and E[d2]  vd. The second integral is:
(A7)    
2
vd     
2
B2  b2  2

  
Bb
again because E[d]  0 and E[d2]  vd. Collecting terms produces
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(A8) u  
  
vd  b2 
2
  
B2  2
2
  
Bb 
(A9) u  
  
	vd  b2
  b2 

  
b2 
2
  
B2  2
2
  
Bb 
(A10) u  
  
	vd  b2
 
2
  
b2 
2
  
B2  2
2
  
Bb 
(A11) u  
  
	vd  b2
 
2
  
	b2  B2  2Bb

and hence the result.
LEMMA A2: Let x1  x2 be the biases of two readers. For any 1 
 c 
 0, the strategy
(A12) sx d 

  
 x  d
maximizes weighted average reader utility cEdux1(s(d))  (1  c) Edux2(s(d)), where x 
cx1  (1  c) x2.
Moreover, for some x1  z  x2, the strategy sz(d)  [/(  )](z  d) maximizes
min{Eux1(s(d)), Eux2(s(d))}.
PROOF:
Consider total utility cEdux1(s(d))  (1  c)Edux2(s(d)), which equals
(A13) 
d
	u  sd2  cd  sd  x1 2  1  cd  sd  x2 2
.
Since the right-hand side shows no interdependency in d, maximizing this integral is equivalent to
maximizing for every single d, the term
(A14) u  sd2  cd  sd  x1 2  1  cd  sd  x2 2.
Taking derivatives with respect to s then produces the first-order condition
(A15) 2s 2d s x 0,
which implies that the optimal slanting is:
(A16) 
  
x  d.
For the second part, let s(d) be a candidate slanting strategy that maximizes min{Eux1(s(d)),
Eux2(s(d))}. Define u1 and u2 to be the expected utilities for s(d). Note that sx1 and sx2 maximize reader
1 and reader 2 utilities, respectively. Consequently, there must be a c such that for x  cx1  (1 
c)x2 the strategy sx yields the same ratio of reader 1 and 2 utilities as the candidate strategy does:
u1/u2. But by the first part of the Lemma, Eui(sx(d)) 
 ui for i  1, 2. Otherwise, the candidate
strategy s(d) would yield higher weighted average utility. But this shows sx maximizes the min and
hence s  sx.
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APPENDIX B: PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
Consider the monopolist’s maximization problem. Reader utility is
(B1) Ur  maxu  s2  P, 0.
Since readers only dislike slanting, a newspaper gets no benefit from slanting and only pays costs.
The optimal strategy for both the homogeneous and heterogeneous case is therefore s*(d)  0. Since
the reader’s gross utility in this case is u , the monopolist can extract all surplus and charge P, so that
the reader’s net utility is 0.
Consider now the duopoly case. Begin with the homogeneous reader case and proceed by
backward induction. Consider the price setting stage. Define Vj to be the utility the reader associates
with reading newspaper j. There are two cases here: equal and unequal utilities. For the case of
unequal utilities, suppose without loss of generality that V1  V2. The price equilibrium is for paper
1 to charge V1  V2 and capture the full market. If V1  V2, then both papers charge zero.
In the strategy-setting stage, holding constant the other’s strategy, both papers’ profit functions are
increasing in the reader utility from the strategies they choose. Consequently, it is a weakly dominant
strategy for each paper to maximize reader utility. From the monopoly case, we know these strategies
are s(d)  0. It is an equilibrium, therefore, to have both prices and slanting equal to zero.
In the heterogeneous reader case, the logic remains the same because reader utility functions are
the same as in the homogeneous case, since utility is independent of beliefs for rational readers. The
homogeneous and heterogeneous cases produce the same incentives for the firm.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
Since the monopolist can extract all surplus, he maximizes expected utility,
(B2) max
s*d
u   
d
s*d2  
d
d s*d b2.
There are no interdependencies in this utility maximization across d’s. Because the maximand is
separable in d, choosing the optimal s*(d) is equivalent to choosing the optimal s* for each d or
(B3) s*d  argmaxsu  s2 d s b2.
For a given d, differentiating with respect to s produces the first-order condition
(B4) s  d  s  b  0,
which implies
(B5) s*hom d

 
b d.
Prices then are equal to the expected utility under this strategy. From Lemma (A1), we know the
expected utility and hence price is
(B6) P*hom  u 

  
	b2  vd
.
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
We proceed by backward induction. Consider the price-setting stage. Let Vj be the reader’s utility
associated with reading paper j. There are two cases here: equal and unequal utilities. For the case
of unequal utilities, suppose without loss of generality that V1  V2. The price equilibrium is for
paper 1 to charge V1  V2 and capture the full market. If V1  V2, then both papers charge zero.
In the stage where the slanting strategy is set, maximizing reader utility is, as before, a weakly
dominant strategy. Holding constant the other firm’s strategy, each firm’s profit is increasing in the
reader utility associated with its strategy. We know from Proposition 2 that the utility-maximizing
strategy is to slant [/(  )](b  d). Therefore, it is an equilibrium for duopolists to choose this
strategy. Since this means both papers provide equal utility, prices equal zero. This shows that this
is an equilibrium. Moreover, this logic directly implies that the only equilibrium involves both papers
choosing a slanting strategy that maximizes utility and prices equal to zero on the equilibrium path.19
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4:
We proceed in three steps:
(1) First, we show that a linear strategy is an optimal one.
(2) Second, we show that of the linear strategies, the strategy with zero bias produces maximum
profit.
(3) Third, we compute the prices the monopolists would charge.
Step 1: Linearity of monopolist’s strategy. The first step is to show that the linear strategy of the type
sB(d)  [/(  )](B  d) is optimal. To show this, suppose s(d) and P form an optimal strategy
for the monopolist. Let X  {biEui(s(d))  P 
 0} be the biases of the readers who read the paper
in this case.20
Since X  [b1, b2] is non-empty, it must have a well-defined inf and sup. Let x1 and x2 be the inf
and sup of this set and u1 and u2 be the utility of these readers. Lemma (A2) shows that a linear
strategy of the form sz(d)  [/(  )](z  d), where z  cx1  (1  c)x2, maximizes min{u1,
u2}. So, sz yields the maximum payoffs for x1 and x2. But by Lemma (A1), all readers with bias
between x1 and x2 have even greater utility from this strategy. Define the price Pz to be min{u1, u2}.
Since x1 and x2 are the inf and sup of the set X, by the formula in Lemma (A1), it is easy to see that
the strategy sz, with price Pz, satisfies the participation constraint of all readers in X.
Let us now contrast the supposed optimum strategy (s, P) with this strategy (sz, Pz). By
construction, sz has at least as large a market share as s since it spans all readers between the inf and
sup of the set X. Moreover, since s satisfies the participation constraint of x1 and x2 we know that
it cannot yield higher gross utility for readers at x1 and x2 than sz does. Hence, we know that P 
Pz. Thus, the linear strategy sz(d) yields at least as much profit as the supposed optimum. This shows
that we can work with a linear strategy as an optimum.
Step 2: Optimal bias is zero. The second step is to show that a monopolist would choose a linear
strategy of sB(d) with B  0. To do this, we proceed by contradiction. Let (B, P) be a linear strategy
B and price P set by a monopolist that we suppose is an optimum strategy. Lemma (A1) shows that
for a reader with bias b receives utility
(B7) u  
  
	vd  b2
 
2
  
	B  b
2  P.
19 Any slanting strategy that deviates on measure zero from the optimal one also forms an equilibrium since expected
utility is the same.
20 This set must be non-empty since the strategy stated in the proposition earns positive profits and an empty readership
would earn zero profits.
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All readers for whom this term is positive will read the paper. Since this is a quadratic equation, we
can define the indifferent readers from this equation. By the quadratic formula, the zeros of this
equation are at z(P, B)  (2B  4B2  4(K/)(  )2)/2(  ) and z(P, B) 
(2B  4B2  4(K/)(  )2/2(  ), where K is defined to be u  [/(  )]vd 
P. Of course, these zero points may lie outside the range of reader biases, so define b(P) 
max(z(P, B), b1) and b(P)  min(z(P, B), b2). By definition, therefore, all individuals within this
interval have weakly positive utility and therefore will purchase the paper.
With these definitions in hand, suppose now the monopolist chooses a B  0. We will consider
three different cases: (a) the case where b and b are both interior (i.e., equal to z and z); (b)
the case where they are both at the boundary (i.e., equal to b2 and b1); and (c) the case where one
is at the boundary and the other is at the interior. First, consider the case where b(B, P)  z(B,
P) and b(B, P)  z(B, P) so that the end points are defined by the quadratic equation and not by
the boundaries of the reader bias distribution. The size of the interval in this case then equals
(B8) zP  zP 
4B2  4 K   2
  
.
But, since the constant K does not depend on B, this is strictly decreasing in B2. Hence, a B  0
strategy cannot be optimal. If B  0, reducing it and keeping prices the same would increase profits,
and similarly for B  0.
Second, consider the case where both endpoints are defined by the boundary so that b  b2 
z and b  b1  z. Let U1 be the gross utility of the reader at the left boundary (i.e., with bias
b1) and U2 be the corresponding utility for the reader at the right boundary. Prices in this case are
defined by P  min{U1, U2}. A price smaller than this could be increased marginally without
violating the participation constraint and raising profits. A price higher than this would violate the
participation constraint of the boundary readers and would be inconsistent with the definition of the
boundary. Yet this price implies a violation of optimality. Lemma (A2) shows that for some c,
choosing B  cb1  (1  c)b2 would maximize min{U1, U2}. Moreover, by the symmetry of the
formula in Lemma (A1) it is clear that c  1⁄2 . So a strategy of B  b  0 would still satisfy the
participation constraint since it is maximizing the minimum utility. Moreover, by switching to this
strategy, the monopolist could increase the price he could charge since min{U1, U2} rises. Profits
also rise because he continues to cover the whole market. Hence, by switching to this strategy, the
monopolist could raise profits and this contradicts B  0 as an optimal strategy.
Third, consider the case where (without loss of generality) b  z  b1 but b  b2  z. By
definition of the roots z and z, the reader at b2 earns greater utility than the reader at z who is
indifferent between buying the paper and not. But in this case, consider a deviation that leaves prices
fixed but changes strategies to B  B  . For small enough   0, this continues to give strictly
positive utility to the reader at b2 and hence he will continue to read. This will increase market share,
however, because some readers with b  z now earn positive utility from reading. Since this
deviation increases market share without decreasing price, the original B could not be an optimum.
As this includes all the cases, we have now shown that profits are maximized by a linear strategy
with B  0. What should optimal prices look like? For B  0, the monopolists profits equal P 
2K where K  u  [/(  )]vd  P. Let Pm be the global maximum of this function. At
this maximum b  b  2/[u  (/(  ))  Pm]. Define this to be Cm. So if b2  b1 
Cm, the monopolist will cover the whole market. He can then set a price equal to the utility of the
boundary reader’s utility, which by Lemma (A1) equals u  [/(  )]vd  2b22.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5:
We proceed by backward induction in several steps:
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(1) We calculate x(P1, P2, z1, z2), the bias of the reader who is indifferent between reading the two
papers if paper j charges Pj and has bias zj (chosen in the first stage of the game and taken as
given in this stage). This allows us to determine the market share of each firm for that location
and price pair.
(2) We then calculate P1R(P2; z1, z2) and P2R(P1; z1, z2), the best response functions for firms 1 and
2, respectively. These are the best price responses of each firm to the other’s price (given the
biases zj which are chosen in the first stage and taken as given in the second stage).
(3) Using these prices, we calculate the equilibrium prices P*1(z1, z2) and P*2(z1, z2) and market share
x*(z1, z2) that result from the choice of bias in the first stage.
(4) We then use these equilibrium prices to show that in the first stage, firms will want to
differentiate as long as z2  3b2. We show that at z2  3b2 and z1  3b1  3b2, the firms are
indifferent between lowering and raising zj and thus in equilibrium.
(5) Finally, we show that all participation constraints for the consumer are satisfied at the
equilibrium.
Step 1: Calculating x(P1, P2; z1, z2). A reader with bias x receives utility:
(B9) u  
  
	vd  x2
 
2
  
	 zj  x

2  Pj
from reading paper j (Lemma (A1)). If the reader with bias x is indifferent between these two
papers, then the utilities from reading the two papers are equal:
(B10)
u 

  
	vd  x2
 
2
  
	 z2  x

2  P2  u 

  
	vd  x2
 
2
  
	 z1  x

2  P1 .
This equality can in turn be simplified to
(B11) 
2
  
	 z1  x
2   z2  x
2
  P2  P1
(B12) 
2
  
 z2  z1 	2x   z2  z1 
  P2  P1
(B13) 2
2
  
z	 x  z
  P
(B14) xP1 , P2 ; z1 , z2   z 
P
z
  
22
where z  ( z1  z2)/ 2, P  P2  P1, and z  z2  z1.
Step 2: Calculation price best response functions PjR(Pj). Since the indifferent reader is located at
x, firm profits are given by
(B15) 1 P1 , P2 ; z1 , z2  
P1
b2  b1
 x  b1 
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(B16) 2 P1 , P2 ; z1 , z2  
P1
b2  b1
b2  x.
The firm’s best price response can be derived by differentiating profits with respect to own price.
For firm 1, this first-order condition is
(B17) 1b2  b1 x  b1  P1  x1P1  0
(B18) x  b1  P1
 x1
P1
 0
(B19) z  P
z
  
22  b1  P1   22z  0
(B20) z  P2
z
  
22  b1  P1
  
2z
(B21)  z  b1 
z2
  

P2
2  P1 .
So the best response function is
(B22) P1RP2 ; z1 , z2  
P2
2  b2  z
z2
  
where we’ve used the fact that b2  b1 by assumption. Similarly, the best response function
for firm 2 is
(B23) P2RP1 ; z1 , z2  
P1
2  b2  z
z2
  
.
Step 3: Calculating equilibrium prices and market share. The Nash equilibrium of prices can be
calculated from the best response functions by solving
(B24) P*1  P1RP2RP*1 ; z1 , z2 
(B25) P*2  P2RP1RP*2 ; z1 , z2 .
The first equation can be calculated as follows:
(B26) P*1  P1RP2RP*1 ; z1 , z2 
(B27) P*1 
P2RP*1 ; z1 , z2 
2  b2  z
z2
  
(B28) P*1 
1
2 P12  b2  z z
2
    b2  z z
2
  
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(B29) 34 P*1 
2z
   b22  z2  z  b2
(B30) P*1 
2z
   2b2  2z3  .
By a similar calculation
(B31) P*2 
2z
   2b2  2z3  .
Using these equilibrium prices, we can also calculate equilibrium market share as
(B32) x* z1 , z2   z  P
  
22z
(B33) x* z1 , z2   z   4z3 
2z
     22z
(B34) x* z1 , z2   z  z
2
3
(B35) x* z1 , z2  
z
3 .
Step 4: Differentiation in choosing bias (the first stage). These prices and market share allow us to
backward induct and examine the firm’s decision in stage 1. Taking the other firm’s bias as given,
they can be used to calculate each firm’s profits for each bias chosen. Specifically profits in stage 1
are
(B36) 1  z1 , z2   P*1  z1 , z2 	 x* z1 , z2   b1 

(B37) 2  z1 , z2   P*2  z1 , z2 	b2  x* z1 , z2 
.
The first-order condition for this problem is instructive. Focusing on firm 1, we can write profits
as
(B38) P*1  z1 , z2  z3  b1 .
Differentiating with respect to z1 gives
(B39) 1
 z1

P*1  z1 , z2 
6 
P*1  z1 , z2 
 z1
 z3  b1
(B40) 1
 z1
 b2  z3 2
2z
6    b2  z3 2
2
   z6  b2  z3 .
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Now we are interested in the sign of this derivative. Define sign( x) to be the function that equals
1 if x  0 and 1 if x  0. We can then write
(B41) sign1 z1   signb2  z3z  b2  z3  	z  6b2  2z

(B42) sign1 z1   signb2  z3  z  z  6b2  2z .
Now suppose that we are in a symmetric case where z1  z2 so that z  0. In this case,
(B43) sign1 z1  z 0  signb2  2z  6b2 
(B44) sign1 z1  z 0  sign2z  6b2 )
(B45) sign1 z1  z 0  sign4z1  6b2 ).
So (1/ z1)z0  0 if and only if 2z1  3b2. In other words, if z1  3⁄2 b2, firm 1 always
has an incentive to further lower z1. If z1  3⁄2 b2, firm 1 has an incentive to raise z1. A similar
derivation shows that (2/ z2)z0  0 only if z2  3⁄2 b2. This, therefore, shows that at z*2 
3⁄2 b2 and z*1   3⁄2 b2, the firms are at a Nash equilibrium for the first stage game. Substitution
shows that for this choice of z*j , prices must be equal to [2/(  )]6b22.
Step 5: Boundary conditions. Finally, we must verify that in equilibrium, the participation con-
straints of the consumer are satisfied. It suffices to show that the consumer located at zero receives
non-zero utility from buying either paper. That is, we must show (by Lemma (1)) that:
(B46) u  
  
vd 
2
  
9
4 b2
2  6
2
  
b22  0
where the first three terms are the gross utility of reading the paper and the last term is the price.
This is equivalent to:
(B47) 334 b2
2 
2
  
	 u 

  
vd ,
which is equivalent to
(B48) b2 	  433   2 u   vd ,
which is what was assumed in the statement of the proposition.
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PROOF OF COROLLARY 4:
Consider the first comparison: CRBhet,duo  CRBhet,mon. From Propositions 5 and 4, we know that
duopolists report more diverse news than the monopolist when readers are heterogeneous. But from
the functional form of xc(  ,  ), we know that this diversity allows the conscientious reader to
cross-check and thus produces less bias for her overall.
Consider the second comparison CRBhet,duo  CRBhom,duo. By Propositions 5 and 3, we know that
reporting in the heterogeneous case is more diverse. So, once again, the increased diversity means
lower conscientious reader bias.
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